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‘Much has been enacted concerning testaments by this great Roman Republic, created, 
as has happily been said, by God, and the books of law are full of the subject.’1  
  
 In Roman law an inheritance could be passed on according to the rules of 
intestate or testate succession.
2
 In the case of intestate succession the heirs were called 
to the inheritance by the rules of the Roman civil law, rather than by the express 
intentions of the deceased.
3
 The postclassical Roman rules for intestate succession 
were complex but focused upon ensuring transmission of the patrimony to the 
decedent's closest relatives - in most cases these would be the decedent's children, 
although this would be others if the decedent had died childless.
4
 A claim for testate 
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1 Justinian, Novel 18pr. (536AD), trans. Blume. 
2 For a concise introduction to Roman intestate succession see T. Rüfner, “Intestate succession in 
Roman law” in Comparative Succession Law. Volume II. Intestate Succession, ed. K.G.C. Reid, M. J. 
de Waal, and R. Zimmermann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 1-32; and for Roman testate 
succession see T. Rüfner, “Testamentary formalities in Roman law,” in Comparative Succession Law. 
Volume I. Testamentary Formalities, ed. K.G.C. Reid, M. J. de Waal, and R. Zimmermann (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 1-26. 
3 Theodosian Code (hencefoth CTh) 4.4.5pr., given at Constantinople in 416AD, refers to intestate 
succession as 'being called to the inheritance by law'. 
4 From 178AD, the children of an intestate woman who died sui iuris ('in her own power') were 
granted a claim to her goods (the bona materna), even if they were still in the power of their father. See 
Rüfner, “Intestate succession in Roman law,” 20-21 and 23-25. 
succession, on the other hand, could only be made if it was in accordance with a 
decedent's express intention, whether that intention had been made known via a 
written document (a duly-witnessed will, a codicil or even letter) or through some 
unwritten means.
5
 In Classical and Postclassical Roman law alike, the fundamental 
act of the testator was the institution of the heir(s). According to Roman law, the 
heir(s) succeeded 'into the position' of the decedent, acquiring the deceased's assests 
and rights in addition to any obligations which survived death, including debts owed.6 
There was no obligation under Roman law to appoint a family relative (close or 
otherwize) as a testate heir. If patrimonial debts were expected to outweigh assets 
then disinheriting the children and appointing someone else as heir was one strategy 
used by testators in order to free their children from 'the burdens which heirship 
imposed'.
7
 The fact that Roman law allowed inheritances to pass outside the family 
created a highly complicated set of legal rules and remedies. Even intestate succession 
could lead to property being transmitted outside the family, as in those cases where 
'trusts' (fideicommissa) were charged on intestate heirs in favour of extraneous 
beneficiaries.
8
 As David Johnston states: ‘Roman society was one in which the wide 
                                                            
5 On oral or 'nuncupative' wills see Justinianic Code (henceforth CI ) 6.11.2.1 (242AD) and CI 
6.23.21.4 =  Novels of Theodosius II (henceforth NTh) 16.6 (439AD). For a detailed overview of the 
relevant Roman imperial legislation see P. Voci, Diritto ereditario romano, volume II, 2nd edition 
(Milan: Giuffrè editore, 1963), P. Voci, “Il diritto ereditario romano nell’età del tardo impero. I. Le 
costituzioni del IV secolo,” Iura 29 (1978): 17-113, and P. Voci, “Il diritto ereditario romano nell’età 
del tardo impero. II. Le costituzioni del V secolo, seconda parte,” in Studi in onore di Cesare 
Sanfilippo volume II (Milan: Università di Catania, 1982), 655-735. 
6 D. Johnston, Roman Law in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 45. 
7 Ibid., ee also E. Champlin, Final Judgments: Duty and Emotion in Roman Wills, 200 B.C. - A.D. 250 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 108-110. 
8 Johnston, Roman Law in Context, 49, citing Digest 29.7.81.1 (Paul). On the historical development of 
fideicommissa see D. Johnston, The Roman Law of Trust (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) and J.C. 
Tate, “Codification of late Roman inheritance law: fidecommissa and the Theodosian Code,” 
Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 76 (2008): 237-248. 
dispersion of property on death was common; in this way a society in which during a 
lifetime much was achieved by friendship and patronage finally paid its obligations’.9 
 Peter Brown has recently argued that social attitudes towards wealth 
ownership and possession changed and developed in the fourth and fifth centuries AD, 
focusing in particular on Christian gift-giving as a strategy that spanned both this life 
and the next.
10
  In the case of Christian gift-giving - whether we are thinking in terms 
of low-level, regular, alms-giving or the more dramatic transfers of wealth made by 
members of the later fourth- and fifth-century senatorial elite - ‘what differed most of 
all was the emphasis on the supernatural efficacy of the Christian gift’.11 Christian 
gift-giving in Late Antiquity did not just link the living with the living and - in the 
case of gifts in contemplation of death and testamentary bequests - the living with the 
dead; it was an expression of trust in Christ's promise of eternal salvation. As 
Catharina Andersson puts it with reference to later mediaeval Europe: ‘Gifts to the 
church and religious houses were one of the clearest manifestations of the relationship 
between the individual and God in the Middle Ages. All over Europe, gifts and 
donations were a natural part of how faith was expressed’.12 In the later Roman period, 
Christian gifts, legacies and inheritances may have been differentiated from non-
                                                            
9 Johnston, The Roman Law of Trust, 5. 
10 P. Brown, The Ransom of the Soul. Afterlife and Wealth in Early Western Christianity (Cambridge 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2015) and P. Brown, Through the Eye of a Needle: Wealth, the Fall 
of Rome, and the Making of Christianity in the West, 350-550 AD (Princeton N.J: Princeton University 
Press, 2012). See also the important essays by J. Harries, “"Treasure in Heaven": Property and 
Influence among Senators of Late Rome,” in Marriage and Property, ed. E.M. Craik (Aberdeen: 
Aberdeen University Press, 1991), 54-70, K. Cooper, “Poverty, obligation, and inheritance: Roman 
heiresses and the varieties of senatorial Christianity in fifth-century Rome,” in Religion, Dynasty and 
Patronage in Early Christian Rome 300-900, ed. K. Cooper and J. Hillner (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 165-189, and J. Hillner,  “Families, patronage, and the titular churches of 
Rome, c.300 - c.600,” in Religion, Dynasty and Patronage in Early Christian Rome 300-900, ed. K. 
Cooper and J. Hillner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 225-261. 
11 Brown, Through the Eye of a Needle, 83. 
12 C. Andersson,  “Gifts and society in fourteenth century Sweden,” in Disputing Strategies in 
Medieval Scandinavia, ed. K. Esmark, L. Hermanson, H.J. Orning, and H. Vogt(Leiden and Boston: 
Brill, 2013), 219-246. 219. 
Christian bequests by their 'supernatural efficacy', but the socio-legal structures that 
governed their operation remained very much part of the here and now.
13 A 
fundamental part of the story of the rise of 'the Christian gift' thus lies precisely in the 
fact that the Roman law of succession ‘...did not prescribe or allow just one pattern of 
behaviour, but presented an array of instruments and rules that permitted testators to 
pursue an almost infinite variety of goals’.14 The Late Antique development of new 
instruments and rules relating to the Christian gift took place within a pre-existing 
legal framework, a legal framework in which - as noted above -  'the wide dispersion 
of property on death was common'. As we shall see, this legal framework was used 
and manipulated by heirs and other beneficiaries, as much as by testators and donors 
themselves.  
 The Roman law of succession, as Fritz Schulz stated, presents us with an 
enormous display of legal ingenuity.15 In this essay I will analyse some of the legal 
instruments and rules by which Late Roman testators and donors (fourth to sixth 
centuries AD) were able to pursue a new set of goals: making over bequests and 
inheritances to the institutional Christian church. In Section I we begin with an 
overview of Roman family law and inheritance structures, paying particular attention 
to postclassical legal developments. In Section II we move on to explore donation and 
inheritance law in the specific context of the institutional Christian church from the 
age of Constantine onwards. Section III expands on this analysis via a focus on 
specific examples of strategic behaviour relating to Christian gift-giving and 
inheritance in the later fourth, fifth and sixth centuries AD. My argument throughout 
                                                            
13 On the fundamental distinction in Roman law between inheritance and bequests of legacies see 
Johnston, Roman Law in Context, 45-47. 
14 R.P. Saller, “Roman Heirship Strategies in Principle and in Practice,” in The Family in Italy: From 
Antiquity to the Present, ed. R. P. Saller and I. Kertzer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991a), 26-
47. 29. 
15 F. Schulz, Classical Roman Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), 203. 
is that the institutional Christian church in Late Antiquity did not so much disrupt 
traditional Roman inheritance strategies, as take advantage of them.
16
  
 
1. Roman family law and inheritance structures. 
 
 The Roman law of succession is intertconnected with Roman family law in the 
sense that ‘… the overriding concern of Roman family law is not with setting 
standards for a family’s life and internal governance but rather with the implications 
of family structure for the holding and disposition of property’.17 According to Roman 
civil law power lay with the senior male ascendant, the pater familias. All 
descendants related to the pater familias through the agnatic (male) line were subject 
to patria potestas, 'paternal power'. The second-century AD jurist Gaius famously 
claimed that patria potestas was ‘unique to Roman citizens, for virtually no other 
peoples have power over their children that is as great as ours…’.18 The pater familias 
owned all family property, hence anything acquired by those under patria potestas 
accrued to him - although various legal mechanisms were developed in order to 
mitigate this fact.
19
 Children and other descendants who were subject to patria 
potestas could be formally released from that power through emancipation or by the 
                                                            
16 Contra J. Goody, The Development of Family and Marriage in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983). On Goody's broader argument concerning the Late Antique Christian Church 
and changes to legal rules relating to inheritance strategies see the fundamental critique of R.P. Saller, 
“European family history and Roman law,” Continuity and Change 6.3 (1991b): 335-346. 
17 B. Frier and T. McGinn, A Casebook on Roman Family Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 4. 
18 Gaius, Institutes, 1.55. 
19 The peculium was originally a limited amount of capital granted by a pater familias to a son-in-
power (a filius familias) or by a master to a slave. Under the early Empire, the term peculium castrense 
referred to anything that a filius familias had earned or acquired for himself from military service; 
under the Later Empire, this was extended to anything earned or acquired as a public official, as an 
advocate, or as an orthodox Christian cleric (peculium quasi castrense). On the peculium quasi 
castrense and Christian clerics see CI 1.3.33 (given at Constantinople, 472AD) and CI 1.3.49 (given at 
Constantinople, 531AD). 
death of the pater familias himself.
20
 Slaves were property and as such were not freed 
automatically on the death of the pater familias, but could be expressly manumitted 
during his lifetime or in accordance with his last wishes.
21
  
 An example of the complex interrelationship between Roman family law and 
the law of succession can be seen clearly in the Roman law prohibition on 
(significant) gifts between spouses. Under the Roman Republic two types of 'legal 
marriage' - as opposed to concubinage- were recognized: cum manu, where a wife 
was transferred into the power of a new pater familias (either her husband himself or 
the senior male head of his familia) and sine manu (where a wife would remain in the 
power of her own pater familias). By the late Republic marriage sine manu had 
become the norm. The shift from marriage cum manu to marriage sine manu entailed 
a corresponding shift from a 'merged' to a 'separate' regime of spousal property.22 
Thus gifts between spouses would have resulted in the transfer of wealth from one 
family-unit to another. As the Severan jurist Paul states, the fact that spouses are not 
to exchange gifts ‘… should not be interpreted as if they do not love each other and 
are hostile, but as between people united by the greatest affection and merely afraid of 
poverty (inopia)’.
23 Until Justinian's reforms of 537 and 542 AD, surviving spouses 
were only entitled to claim succession on intestacy if their deceased partner left 
                                                            
20 On patria potestas see J.A. Crook, “Patria Potestas,” Classical Quarterly 17 (1967): 113-22. 
Champlin commenting on a series of papers on Roman demography by Richard Saller and Ketih 
Hopkins, suggests that ‘...roughly 50 percent of Roman males who reached 14 (and legal maturity) 
were already sui iuris and thus capable of making a will’. Champlin, Final Judgments, 105.  
21 On slaves as property and part of a patrimony see CI 6.38.5 (given at Constantinople, 532AD).  
22 S. Dixon, The Roman Family, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1992), 74. 
23 Digest 24.1.28.2, Paul . Constantine maintained the basic Roman principles, but overhauled the legal 
procedures relating to donations. For further discussion see C. Dupont, “Les Donations dans les 
constitutions de Constantin,” Revue Internationale des droits de l'antiquité 9 (1962): 291-324.  
behind no surviving blood relatives.
24
 Wives could be instituted as (extraneous) heirs 
or co-heirs to testaments. They could also be left legacies and fideicommissa, 
including those which made provision for the return of their dowry.25 As should 
already be apparent, Roman legal experts and imperial legislators elaborated a 
complex set of rules concerning intestate and testate succession. I will turn briefly 
now to each in turn, before moving on to explore the specific development of late 
Roman legal rules concerned exclusively with 'the Christian gift' in Part III below.  
 ‘Intestate succession is a succession in which the beneficiaries are determined 
not by the deceased but by the residual rules of civil law; it is for this reason that the 
intestate heirs are known as legitimi, since they succeed by the authority of law (lex) 
rather than at a testator’s whim.’26 Roman rules for intestate succession effectively 
operated as a set of default rules which only came into operation when an individual 
either failed to leave a will, or when the will that had been left failed.
27
 The Urban 
Praetor at Rome, alongide other magistrates, provided a complex set of remedies and 
actions that could be pursued by disappointed parties in the event of intestate 
succession. By the end of the second century AD, however, the priority of claims 
normally went first to the sui heredes (those who became sui iuris on the death of the 
pater familias; then to those connected to the deceased by legitimate descent from a 
common ancestor through the male line (agnates); then to cognatic relations; only 
then, as noted above, was the surviving spouse to be considered. If none of these 
classes of persons came forward then the inheritance fell to the Imperial fisc. It is 
                                                            
24 Novel 53 and Novel 117. Both of these constitutions were included in the medieval (Latin) collection 
of Justinian's Novels known as the Authenticum (Rüfner, 2015: 29). On testate succession between 
spouses see Valentinian III Novel, 21.1.1 (posted at Rome, 446 AD). 
25 Champlin, Final Judgments, 116-124. 
26 Johnston, The Roman Law of Trust, 117. 
27 The emperor Justinian made important revisions to the rules concerning intestate succession in his 
Novels 118 (543AD) and 127 (548). 
worth stressing here again that, according to Classical and Postclassical Roman law, 
even an intestate heir could be charged with a fideicommissary 'trust'. Hence despite 
the fact that the rules for intestate succession only provided for degrees of family 
relations, an intestate inheritance could nonetheless be transferred outside the family 
if that was the (deceased) donor's stated intention. 
 Any Roman citizen with full legal capacity could make a will.
28
 As David 
Johnston states: ‘A testator's only necessary act in making a will was to appoint an 
heir... The heir did not simply acquire the property of the deceased: he succeeded him 
as a person, and so was entitled to beneift from and was bound by (almost) all 
obligations in favour of or against the deceased. He was heir, moreover, for good: 
semel heres semper heres’.29 Later Roman law had a number of formal requirements 
in order for a will to be considered valid, including that it had to have been duly 
witnessed or deposited in the archive of a municipality or an imperial bureaucratic 
archive.
30
 In 446 the Western Emperor Valentinian III confirmed the validity of 
'holographic wills': wills written entirely in the testator's own hand which did not have 
to be witnessed, signed or sealed,31 but this constitution was not included in 
Justinian's Codex nor was it confirmed by any of Justinian's subsequent Novellae.
32
 
The requirement that an heir had to be instituted at the beginning of the testament - 
before any other kinds of testamentary provisions were made, such as legacies 
(legata), 'trusts' (fideicommissa), the appointment of tutors, the manumission of slaves, 
                                                            
28 Legal capacity, if lacking, could in many cases be supplemented by a tutor or curator (according to 
the Roman rules for guardianship and curatorship). 
29 Johnston, The Roman Law of Trust, 2-3. 
30 On the deposition of a testament in public archives (a testamentum apud acta conditum) see P. Voci, 
“Il diritto ereditario romano nell’età del tardo impero”, 11-13. 
31 Valentinian III Novel 21.2, given at Rome 446 AD. 
32 CTh 2.24.1 (Constantine to the Urban Prefect Verinus given 321AD, amended to 324AD by Seeck) 
only permitted incomplete or otherwise legally deficient testimonies to stand if they instituted the sui 
heredes as heirs. 
or the disinheritance of close relatives - seems to have been relaxed during the 
postclassical period and was formally abolished by Justinian.33 Until the age of 
Justinian, however, the legal validity of any legacies left by the testator remained 
dependent on the heir(s) being instituted, as it was the heir(s) who had to execute the 
legacies. The wording of legacies also had to comply with a set of formal 
requirements, corresponding to different formal types of bequests.
34 As we shall see, 
'trusts' (fideicommissa) offered testators more flexibility; a 'trust' could be made over 
to any beneficiary under a will, asking him or her to transfer (almost) all or part of 
what they had received under the testament to a third person or institution. For 
example, the 381AD testament of the Cappodocian bishop Gregory of Nazianzus 
names as sole heir a deacon and monk who had formerly been owned by Gregory's 
family as a slave and entrusts him with transferring the bulk of the estate to the 
Church of Nazianzus, alongside bequeathing various gifts and legacies to specific 
named individuals.
35
 Fideicommissa did not necessarily have to be mentioned in the 
will itself. They could be executed by letter or codicil, by spoken word, or even 
through a non-verbal gesture.
36
 In sum, in the case of testamentary succession, 
property could effectively be left to (almost) anyone the testator wanted provided that 
a basic set of formal requirements was complied with. 
 Under the early and late Empire close descendants (or ascendants) who could 
demonstrate that they had been left less than a quarter of the share that they would 
                                                            
33 Pauli Sententiae 3.6.2; CI 6.23.24, given at Constantinople, 528 AD. 
34 Justinianic reforms to these requirements: CI 6.43.1.1 (529 AD) and CI 6.43.2.1 (531 AD). 
35 Gregory's testament is the earliest Roman testament to survive in full. Champlin, Final Judgments, 
29. See J. Beaucamp, trans. and ed., “Le Testament de Grégoire de Nazianze,” in Fontes Minores X: 
Forschungen zur byzantinischen Rechtsgeschichte, ed. L. Burgmann (Frankfurt am Main: Löwenklau, 
1998), 1-100.. 
36 Postclassical wills could also include a clause to the effect that if the will failed to be valid under 
civil or praetorian law then it should be 'as with codicils or trusts under intestacy'. For a late 
(Visigothic) example see S. Corcoran, “The donation and will of Vincent of Huesca: Latin text and 
English translation,” Antiquité Tardive 11 (2003): 215-221. 
have received if the testator had died intestate could pursue a querela inofficiosi 
testamenti: a complaint against an 'undutiful' will.
37
 As Zimmerman notes: ‘The key 
issue, in this respect, was whether the will was undutiful in the sense of failing to 
show at least a minimum amount of consideration for the deceased's closest 
relatives’.38 If the close relative(s) (usually children) had been formally disinherited 
and the grounds for that disinheritance were upheld during the querela then the close 
relative(s) received nothing. Close relatives who had not been disinherited with good 
reason could expect to be left what came to be referred to as the 'Falcidian share' or 
the 'legitimate portion': ‘a quarter of the prospective intestate share’.
39
 This was a 
quarter share to all the close relatives in total and unequal divisions of estates were 
relatively common.
40
 If a complaint against an undutiful will was upheld by the courts, 
then the will (usually) failed, and hence the estate would be transmitted according to 
the rules for intestate succession. Roman law thus protected close relatives who had 
been 'undutifully' overlooked by granting them a procedural remedy in order to 
contest the testator's will.
41
 Again, as David Johnston explains: ‘the availability of 
trusts on intestacy made it possible to bypass the requirements of the querela (light 
                                                            
37 For further discussion see the paper by Charles Reid in this volume. 
38 R. Zimmermann, “Compulsory heirship in Roman Law,” in Exploring the Law of Succession. 
Studies National, Historical and Comparative, ed. K.G.C. Reid, M. J. de Waal, and R. Zimmermann 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 27-48. 28. 
39 Johnston, The Roman Law of Trust, 4. The term 'falcidian share' looks back to the lex Falcidia, a 
Republican statute passed in 40BC. The lex Falcidia, however, originally addressed a rather different 
problem of legacies that depleted a testate heir's inheritance to such an extent that it was no longer 
worth the heir 's trouble to accept the inheritance. The lex Falcidia accordingly ‘...required that the 
heirs should retain at least a quarter of the net estate’ Johnston, The Roman Law of Trust, 5. This 
technical meaning also appears in Justinianic constitutions, for example CI 1.3.48 (given at 
Constantinople, 531AD) and Justinian, Novel 1.2 and Novel 119.11 (544AD). 
40 For example, if a pater familias had two children he could bequeath a fifth of the estate to one and a 
twentieth of the estate to another and thus fulfill the requirement of the 'falcidian share'. 
41 Constantine extended this remedy to mothers: ‘just as a legitimate child omitted as heir from a 
parent's will could challenge that will as 'undutiful', so too a mother should be granted the right to 
proceed against her son's testament on the same grounds’ (CTh 2.19.2 = CI 3.28.28, given at Serdica 
321AD). 
though those were) and dispose of property without restriction’.42 The important point 
for us to note in relation to the postclassical 'legitimate portion', however, is the more 
basic fact that a testator was free - if they wished - to distribute at least three quarters 
of his or her estate away from close relatives.
43
 
 Alongside protecting the interests of close relatives, some late Roman imperial 
constitutions also exhibit a marked anxiety concerning the tight-knit cohesiveness of 
family units. CTh 8.12.5 (given at Constantinople, 333AD) sums up the problem: 
‘…since indeed in the case of secret and domestic frauds anything one pleases can 
easily be devised, taking advantage of the opportunity of a situation, or that which has 
been done can be destroyed’.
44
 For example, an imperial constitution issued three 
years later states that senators and those who hold various high-ranking provincial and 
municipal dignities are known to be treating illegitimate children as 'legitimate' - 
either by simply acting as if these children were legitimate (by designating them as 
'legitimate' heirs in their wills and by donating gifts to them as if they were legitimate), 
or by petitioning the emperor for personal beneficia (privileges or exemptions) which 
would legalize the relevant property transactions and by implication the children 
themselves.45 The drafter of this 336AD constitution was also aware that powerful 
high-ranking men were attempting to circumvent the spirit of the emperor's legislation 
by using specific legal mechanisms and dodges. These included naming a third party 
as a 'legitimate' heir, who was then to pass the property on to its 'illegitimate' intended 
                                                            
42 Johnston, The Roman Law of Trust, 280. 
43 In 536AD Justinian raised the 'legitimate portion' owed to children (Justinian Novel 18.1), having 
previously raised it for sons of curials or daughters married to curials (Justinian Novel 18.2). In a 
542AD constitution Justinian also ruled that no close relative could pass over or disinherit a descendant 
or ascendant except on explict grounds detailed by Justinian himself (Novel 115.3-5). 
44 ‘...si quidem clandestinis ac domesticis fraudibus facile quidvis pro negotii opportunitate confingi 
potest vel id quod gestum est aboleri.’ 
45 CTh 4.6.3. 
beneficiary,46 or having other family members swear oaths and pacts that they would 
not challenge a will in which the illegitimate children were institued as heirs.
47
 
 A 317AD constitution, issued by Constantine to the fiscal officials of Spain, 
had already attempted to tackle the specific problem of inheritances being transferred 
by secret 'trusts' (fideicommissa): namely, trusts set up to circumvent the law by 
transferring property via a third party to a beneficiary who was forbidden to take it by 
the law.48 According to this text, anyone who had been charged with such a trust 
should immediately inform the imperial officials, produce the records (gesta) and 
repudiate the deed; as an incentive, those who informed against themselves in this 
way would receive a third of the deceased's entire estate.
49 Thus a trustee could 
benefit significantly by reporting any property that had been left, by trust, to a 
beneficiary who was not entitled by law to take it. We will return to this point in 
Sections II and III below. The fact that late Roman imperial constitutions explicitly 
prohibited 'secret trusts', alongside other dodges, is an important reminder of how 
legislative enactments can, in some cases, relate directly to social practice. Late 
Roman emperors, like their predecessors, worked within a system of private law that 
was, at base, founded on remedies: on finding legal solutions to disputes and case-
specific problems. The elite, those with the most to lose, also had the most to gain 
from attempting to work the civil law to their own specific advantages, thus 
prompting - in turn - new Imperial legislation. 
                                                            
46 CTh 4.6.3.2. 
47 CTh 4.6.3.3. Contrast Justinian Novel 74, praef., referring to a situation where illegitimate children 
‘...did not want to be legitimized because their father would then have controlled their maternal 
inheritance’. For further discussion see A. Arjava, “Paternal Power in Late Antiquity,” Journal of 
Roman Studies 88 (1998): 147-165. 160. 
48 CTh 10.11.1 = CI 10.13.1. 
49 ‘Is, cuius tacitae fidei commissa fuerit hereditas, statim officio gravitatis tuae  nuntiet et gesta prodat 
et continuo quod actum fuerit renuntiet, et post hanc fidem tertiam ab omnibus defuncti bonis percipiat 
portionem.’ (The constitution goes on to discuss the specific case where a wife is the intended 
beneficiary of a secret trust.) 
 II. Gift-giving, inheritance and the institutional Christian church. 
 
‘A man in the crowd said to him [Christ], Master, tell my brother to give me a share 
of our inheritance. 'My friend' , he replied, ‘who appointed me your judge, or the 
arbitrator of your claims?'’.50 
 
 According to the Gospel of Luke, Christ refused to involve himself in 
inheritance disputes. During the first three centuries AD there is extra-legal evidence 
for gifts, legacies, trusts and inheritances being left to Christian clerics and churches, 
but the first direct and explicit mention of this practice in a Roman legal text occurs in 
a Constantinian constitution from 321AD. The relevant excerpted text in the 
Theodosian Code reads in its entirety:  
 
 ‘Let every dying person have the freedom to leave what goods he wishes to 
 the most holy and venerable Catholic council. Let the judgements [sc. final 
 judgements?] not fail. There is nothing which is owed more to men, than that 
 the expression of their last choice, after which they cannot wish for another 
 thing, be free and that their power of choice, which will not return again, be 
 unrestrained’.
51
 
 
                                                            
50 Gospel of Luke, 12.13-15, trans. Jerusalem Bible. 
51 CTh 16.2.4 = CI 1.2.1, posted at Rome in 321AD and addressed 'to the people'. ‘Habeat unusquisque 
licentiam sanctissimo catholicae uenerabilique concilio decedens bonorum quod optauit relinquere. 
Non sint cassa iudicia. Nihil est, quod magis hominibus debetur, quam ut supremae uoluntatis, post 
quam aliud iam uelle non possunt, liber sit stilus et licens, quod iterum non redit, arbitrium.’ 
We will look first at what this excepted text from the Theodosian Code (issued in 438 
AD) does say and then try to piece together what it does not: namely, the original 321 
AD background and possible context.
52
 Why did Constantine issue this constitution 
and what can it tell us about inheritance strategies and disputes in the early fourth 
century AD? 
 As it stands, CTh 16.2.4 confirms that a dying person can leave what he 
wishes of his property to the 'most holy and venerable Catholic council'. The 
legislator's specific concern here is that the 'judgements', the 'power of choice', of 
individuals on their deathbeds should not be ineffectual. The constitution thus 
presupposes that the deathbed judgements themselves are firm. The question here 
does not concern doubt over the dying individual's intent.
53
 Rather the doubt seems to 
have arisen because of the way in which that intent had been expressed. In other 
words, the issue seems to be with the verbal formulation 'the most holy and venerable 
Catholic council'. The 311AD Edict of Galerius and the 313AD Letter of Licinius (the 
so-called 'Edict of Milan'), both written in the aftermath of the Tetrarchic 
antiChristian persecutions, refer to Christian communities as conventicula and 
ecclesia (assemblies, places of assembly).
54
 In the 313AD letter of Licinius, moreover, 
property that had been confiscated during the persecutions is to be restored either to 
individual (named) Christians or to the holy Christian corpus ('body'), which the text 
glosses with the phrase id est ecclesia ('that is the church'). There is no mention of 
concilium as a generic term denoting 'the' or 'a' Christian community. Is this the 
                                                            
52 Seeck suggested that this extract was part of a much broader imperial constitution (issued on 31 
January 320), which may have included the texts extracted at CTh 3.2.1; 4.12.3; 8.16.1; 9.7.3 and CI 
6.9.9; 6.23.15 and 6.37.21. 
53 On Constantine prioritising the intent of a testator over verbal formulations see Eusebius, Life of 
Constantine, 4.26 
54 Lactantius, On the Deaths of the Persecutors, 34 -35 (Galerius) and 48 (Licinius), quoted in Latin;, 
Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 8.17 (Galerius) and 10.5 (Licinius), in Greek translations from Latin. 
problem that originally lay behind our 321AD enactment? According to T.D. Barnes 
the text at CTh 16.2.4 ‘...requires an emendation which does not seriously affect its 
meaning’: he inserts the word 'ecclesia' into the first sentence, to read ‘Let every 
person of his deathbed have the freedom to leave what he wishes of his property to 
the most holy council of the Catholic church’.55 The fact, however, that the 
designation ecclesia is missing here may in fact be the very point of this constitution, 
at least in its original 321AD context. Was the verbal formulation 'the most holy and 
venerable Catholic council' a legally valid one, in terms of designating an heir or the 
beneficiary of a legacy or fideicommissum? Constantine's answer was yes.  
 This suggestion of a possible context for Constantine's 321 AD constitution 
opens up a further set of questions concerning what may have motivated the issuing 
of the text in the first place. There are a number of plausible scenarios, one of which 
is that the original text was prompted by a specific case or concrete legal problem. For 
example, a dying person made a will, left a legacy, or entrusted a fideicommissum (the 
extant text - as it stands at CTh 16.2.4 - allows for all these possibilites) with the 'most 
holy and venerable Catholic council' as an heir or some other kind of beneficiary. The 
last wishes of this dying person were subsequently challenged, perhaps by close 
relatives of the deceased or by creditors to the estate, on the grounds of the wording: 
'the most holy and venerable Catholic council'. In order for an individual or an 
institution, such as a municipality, to be instituted as an heir, or to receive a legacy 
lawfully, they had to have testamentary capacity.56 Did the 'most holy and venerable 
Catholic council' have testamentary capacity? We could, for example, envisage a 
situation where close relatives of the deceased had refused to hand over property that 
                                                            
55 T. Barnes, Constantine: Dynasty, Religion and Power in the Later Roman Empire, (Chichester: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 139-140. 
56 D. Johnston, “Munificence and Municipia: Bequests to Towns in Classical Roman Law,” Journal of 
Roman Studies 75 (1985): 105-125. 
had been bequeathed to the 'most holy and venerable Catholic council'. It would then 
be left up to ecclesiastical officials to attempt to claim the inheritance or bequest via 
the imperial courts. In the specific case of a fideicommissum if there was uncertainty 
or doubt in the mind of any individual who had been charged with transferring 
property to 'the most holy and venerable Catholic council' then they may have been 
prompted to report the bequest to the imperial authorities themselves, under the rules 
for 'secret trusts' laid down by Constantine four years earlier.
57
 Under each of these 
scenarios, Constantine promulgated his 321AD constitution in order to clear up any 
confusion: every dying person has ‘... the freedom to leave whatever goods he wishes 
to the most holy and venerable Catholic council’.
58 Constantine's 321AD constitution 
thus does not simply confirm the validity of inheritances and deathbed gifts left to the 
Catholic Church, it is also evidence for the legal complexities and potential challenges 
that such bequests could entail. 
 Bequeathing property to the institutional church - whether in the form of gifts 
transferred between the living (donatio inter vivos), gifts made in contemplation of 
death (donatio mortis causa) or property left by testamentary bequests and 
inheritances - is a recurring topos in fifth- and sixth-century biographies of those elite 
senatorial Christians who disinherited themselves ‘in order to achieve their 
                                                            
57 CTh 10.11.1. Discussed in section I above. Compare H. Vogt, “The power to judge: Jurisdiction in 
property conflicts in thirteenth-century Denmark,” in Disputing Strategies in Medieval Scandinavia, ed. 
K. Esmark, L. Hermanson, H.J. Orning, and H. Vogt (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013), 161-180.170 on 
donations, both inter vivos and mortis causa, as the grounds for dispute in over a third of property 
conflicts known from the thirteenth-century Kingdom of Denmark and duchy of Schleswig. On 
medieval donations more generally see W. Davies, ed., The Languages of Gift in the Early Middle Ages 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
58 In either 320 or 326 Constantine legislated to clear up further confusions surrounding legacies and 
trusts (CI 6.23.15, CI 6.37.21 and CI 6.9.9, originally from the same constitution). Further discussion at 
Johnston, The Roman Law of Trust, 213. 
inheritance in heaven’.
59
 As Elizabeth Clark states: ‘The examples of Olympias, of 
Melania the Younger, and of Demetrias suggest that once the female ascetic could 
counter the laws forbidding the 'under-aged' (i.e., those under twenty-five) to disperse 
family property without a special exemption, or laws allowing relatives to declare 
them prodigal or demented, they were free to dispense vast amounts of money and 
property as they chose - in these cases, to the church, to Christian charities, and to 
ascetic programs’.60 Anicia Faltonia Proba (d.432AD), the elite daughter, wife and 
'mother of consuls', apparently made over the income of her estates in Asia to support 
the Christian clergy, the poor and the monasteries.
61 The Passio SS. Alexandri, Eventii 
et Theodoli martyrum, a sixth- or early seventh-century Roman 'gesta martyrum', 
portrays the reverse scenario of a (second-century) vir illustris and urban prefect 
donating his wife's patrimonium - alongside some of his own property - to the Bishop 
of Rome.62 Such examples, as Elizabeth Clark and Jill Harries have argued, showcase 
the 'antifamilial tendencies' of Late Roman ascetic discourse.63 In order to store up 
treasure in heaven, patrimonies have to be given away to the institutional Church or to 
pious causes. This radical ideology of renunciation is a striking feature of late antique 
Christian ascetic discourse, but to focus primarily on the ideology itself risks masking 
a fundamental fact. Roman inheritance law permitted the bulk of a patrimony to pass 
                                                            
59 As Jerome phrased it in his Letter 108.6, describing Paula, a later fourth-century Roman matron of 
high senatorial rank who distributed all her wealth to her children before departing for an ascetic life in 
the Holy Land. On Paula see L.L. Coon, Sacred Fictions: Holy Women and Hagiography in Late 
Antiquity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010),103-109. 
60 E.A. Clark, “Antifamilial tendencies in Ancient Christianity,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 5.3 
(1995): 356-380. 372. 
61 Cooper, “Poverty, obligation, and inheritance,” 169. The description of Anicia Faltonia Proba is 
from ILS 1269.  
62 K. Sessa, “Domestic conversions: households and bishops in the late antique "papal legends,"” in 
Religion, Dynasty and Patronage in Early Christian Rome 300-900, ed. K. Cooper and J. Hillner 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 79-114. 101. 
63 Clark, “Antifamilial tendencies in Ancient Christianity” and Harries, “"Treasure in Heaven"”. 
outside the family and we find late Roman law itself underpinning these radical, elite, 
acts of wealth redistribution.
64  
 The Life of Melania the Younger, originally written by Gerontius in Jerusalem 
in 452-453AD, carefully dramatizes the legal complexities involved in the hyper-
wealthy Melania's process of ascetic conversion. Early in the Life the audience is told 
that Melania's father was thinking of disinheriting Melania and her husband Pinian 
and redistributing their possessions to the other children, whilst ‘...every one of their 
senatorial relatives had schemed for their goods...’.65 Melania - acting through the 
Empress Serena - then acquires a decree from the Emperor Honorius, to be 
promulgated in every province, ordering that her and Pinian's property was to be 
liquidated through the actions of imperial governors and ministers, with the proceeds 
to be given to Melania and Pinian themselves.66 We are later told that because of the 
barbarian invasions some of this property could not be sold.
67
 Meanwhile, the Prefect 
of the City of Rome, together with the Roman Senate, is portrayed as deciding to 
confiscate Pinian's and Melania's property for the public treasury.
68
 Once Melania has 
set sail from Italy she is depicted in the Life as a faithful donor to Christian 
communities and to pious causes, but she is also portrayed as a trustworthy and 
                                                            
64 Roman (provincial) law also underpins narratives of property donation and inheritance in late 
antique monastic literature. For further discussion see R.S. Bagnall, “Monks and property: rhetoric, law, 
and patronage in the Apophthegmata Patrum and the papyri,” Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 42 
(2001): 7-24 and E.R. O'Connell, “Transforming monumental landscapes in Late Antique Egypt: 
monastic dwellings in legal documents from Western Thebes,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 15.2 
(2007): 239-273. 
65 Section 12, from E.A. Clark, trans., The Life of Melania the Younger (New York and Toronto: 
Edwin Mellen Press, 1984), 36. 
66 Section 13. 
67 Section 37. In Section 19 the narrator comments: ‘Everybody praised the Lord of all things, saying 
'Lucky are the ones who anticipated what was to come and sold their possessions before the arrival of 
the barbarians!'’. Ibid. 42.  
68 Section 19. In the narrative, this confiscation does not take place because the Prefect is lynched to 
death ‘by God's providence’, by a mob rioting over a bread shortage. Ibid. 42.Further discussion at  
ibid. 102-108. 
scrupulous recipient of donations on behalf of others. In keeping with late Roman 
legislation, Melania would not accept any donations from heretics ‘to give for the 
service of the poor’.
69
 Those donations that Melania did accept she administered as a 
model intermediary:  
 
 ‘Not only did she offer to God that which was her own; she also helped others 
 to do the same. Thus many of those who loved Christ furnished her with their 
 money, since she was a faithful and wise steward. She commanded these 
 monies to be distributed honestly and judiciously according to the request of 
 the donor’.70  
 
Ensuring that the wishes of donors were met - that their donations and legacies were 
put to the specific uses for which they were originally intended - was a longstanding 
legal issue.
71
 Melania may have practiced an 'antifamilial' radical asceticism, but she 
is portrayed throughout her Life as acting in accordance with the structures and 
principles of late Roman law. 
  Late Roman Imperial legislation suggests that some families even attempted 
to harness the 'antifamilial tendencies' of Christian asceticism, in order to develop 
new forms of estate planning. As Peter Brown puts it: ‘Well-to-do families had come 
to use the Church so as to husband their own threatened resources’.72 Section 3 of 
Novel 6 of the Emperor Majorian, given at Ravenna in 458 AD, legislates against 
parents who have promised their daughters to perpetual virginity, instead of 
                                                            
69 Section 27, trans. ibid. 46. On the late Roman legislation barring heretics from various legal 
transactions see Section III below. 
70 Clark,  The Life of Melania the Younger, 48. 
71 Justinian attempted to deal with this problem of enforcement in relation to pious donations in his 
Novel 131.10 and 12 (545AD). 
72 Brown, Through the Eye of a Needle, 439. 
committing them to a marital union, either in order to avoid having to pay a dowry or 
to cut down on the number of children eligible for a share in the patrimonial 
inheritance.
73
 Granting daughters as pious gifts to nunneries was a way of creating 
‘social bonds and symbolic capital’, as Catharina Andersson has argued with 
reference to medieval Sweden.74 It was also, however, a means of managing 
economic capital in the here and now.  
 From Constantine's 321AD enactment onwards, a complex body of imperial 
legislation and conciliar rulings developed concerning inheritances and gifts given 
and received by clerics, monks and others dedicated to a Christian ascetic life. For 
example, in 419AD an assembly of bishops at Carthage attempted to remove any 
ambiguity by deciding that a cleric who entered orders as a poor man had to place all 
his subsequent property acquisitions under the ownership of the church. Provisions 
were also made, however, for clerics to still take personal inheritances: ‘If something 
has come to them in a private capacity through the generosity of an individual or in 
family succession, then they should do with it what suits their purpose’.75 The 
complexity of the situations that could arise in late Roman ecclesiastical and monastic 
settings concerning inheritance and succession can be seen in an imperial constitution 
issued in 434 AD. This constitution, excerpted at CTh 5.3.1 and CI 1.3.20, lays down 
what ought to happen to the property of ‘a bishop, priest, deacon, deaconess, sub-
deacon or cleric of another rank, or some monk, or some woman who is consecrated 
to the solitary life’ if they die intestate. If there were no surviving close relativesor a 
spouse then the goods were to go to the church or monastery to which the deceased 
had been dedicated, except in those cases where the deceased had had the status of a 
                                                            
73 Compare Justinian Novel 123.37 (546AD). 
74 Andersson,  “Gifts and society in fourteenth century Sweden.”  
75 Canones in Causa Apiani, 32 = CCL 149, 144. 
colonus (an individual ascribed on the tax list of a specific estate), a curial, or a 
freedman: it is not right, the emperors state, that the churches should hold the goods 
that are owed by law to the proprietor of an estate, or to the municipal councils or to a 
patron. The constitution also explicitly affirms the individual churches' right of action 
to pursue said proprietors of estates, municipal councils and patrons, if it turns out 
that the deceased cleric, monk or ascetic died whilst obligated by business 
transactions, or any other acts, relating to that church The 434AD constitution ends by 
stating that any lawsuits arising from petitions for the property of intestate clerics, 
monks etc. which are pending in the courts shall be stopped and that henceforth no 
(extraneous) claimant is allowed to enter court and annoy the church stewards, the 
monks or the procurators, since the law is now clear.
76
 The 434AD constitution is thus 
a clear example of the emperors' legislating in response to complexities and 
difficulties thrown up by concrete legal cases concerning inheritance and succession 
in ecclesiastical and monastic contexts. Other later examples cover what should 
happen to the property of clerics and monks when they choose to enter upon those 
orders and what should happen to their property if they decide to leave, including the 
question of whether property acquired by a bishop whilst a bishop should accrue to 
him or to his church.
77
 
 In order to avoid intestate succession clerics and monks who had legal 
capacity could, of course, make testamentary dispositions (as we have already seen in 
the case of Gregory, Bishop of Nazianzus). A set of late fifth- and early sixth-century 
                                                            
76 The Visigothic interpretation to CTh 5.3.1 adds the explicit point that bishops and other persons 
designated in the law have the unrestricted right to make a will. Corcoran, “The donation and will of 
Vincent of Huesca” discusses a Visgothic bishop's will and a preceding act of donation made in favour 
of a monastery. 
77 CI 1.3.38 (undated), Justinian Novel 131.13 (545 AD) and Justinian Novel 123, 1, 3, 16, and 38-40 
(546 AD). On the property of 'deaconesses' and their testamentary capacity see CTh 16.2.27 (given at 
Milan, 390 AD); CTh 16.8.28 (given at Verona, 390 AD); and Justinian Novel 123.30 (546 AD). 
imperial constitutions deal with the situation where bishops, presbyters and deacons 
'of the holy orthodox church' have acquired property whilst in clerical orders but 
whilst still under paternal power. A 472AD constitution of the Eastern Emperor Leo 
states that clerics who are under paternal power  are free to alienate their own 
property acquired whilst in clerical orders by will, by gift or by any other manner.78 
By analogy with the personal wages earned by a Roman soldier (the peculium 
castrense) and later by certain members of the imperial bureaucracy, this specific kind 
of property held by bishops, presbyters and deacons was not to count as part of the 
patrimonial estate when the pater familias died. This legal ruling, however, 
apparently gave rise to further familial conflict. A 531AD constitution,79 issued by 
Justinian, states that since the law of Leo permitted a bishop or presbyter to make a 
will disposing of their peculium quasi castrense, doubt has arisen as to whether those 
wills can be subject to a querela inofficiosi testamenti (a complaint against an 
'undutiful' will, made by close relatives, discussed above). In the 531AD constitution 
Justinian ruled that such a testament could not be annulled as undutiful. In 546AD, 
however, he removed the complication as far as bishops were concerned by stating 
that they were automatically released from paternal power by their ordination, if they 
were not sui iuris already - at the same time as extending the peculium quasi 
castrense to other clerics (subdeacons, readers, singers), with the proviso that their 
children were now entitled to the 'legitimate portion'.80 This complex weighing and 
balancing of familial claims against the interests of extraneous heirs - including but 
not limited to the institutional church, monastic foundations and other Christian pious 
causes - is a recurring feature of late Roman imperial legislation. It also, as we shall 
                                                            
78 CI.1.3.33. 
79 CI.1.3.49. 
80 Justinian Novel 123.4 and 123.19. 
see in Section III, opened up new opportunities for strategic behaviour by monks, 
clerics and the imperial legislators themselves. 
 
III. Gift-giving, inheritance and strategic behaviour. 
 
‘By trusts we play with the laws...’.
81
 
 
 In 370AD the emperor Valentinian I addressed a letter to the Bishop of Rome, 
Damasus, and ordered that it was to be read out in the City's churches (lecta in 
ecclesiis Romae).
82
 In this letter Valentinian revisited the time-honoured ‘moral 
crime’, as Champlin phrases it, of captatio: inheritance hunting.
83
 Valentinian's 
specific target, however, was protecting widows and young women under 
guardianship (pupillae) from inheritance hunting by Christian ecclesiastics, ex-
ecclesiastics and 'continents' (namely ascetics and monks). The kinsmen of these 
women should report such individuals to the imperial authorities and they would be 
dealt with by the public courts. Valentinian also ruled that henceforth, unless 
ecclesiastics, ex-ecclesiastics or continents inherited property from these women on 
the grounds that they were close relatives, they could obtain nothing via gift or last 
will.
84
 The property would instead be appropriated by the imperial fisc. The 370AD 
constitution also specifically rules out ecclesiastics being able to receive anything via 
gift or last testament ‘through an interposed person’: property cannot be transferred 
                                                            
81 Jerome, Letter 52.6. ‘Per fidei commissa legibus inludimus...’ 
82 Excerpted at CTh 16.2.20. 
83 On 'inheritance hunting' as portrayed in the literature of the Late Republic and early Empire see 
Champlin, Final Judgments, 87-102. 
84 Ambrose Bishop of Milan makes a carefully worded protest against this rule in his Letter 73.13-14 
[Maur. 18.13-14], addressed to the Emperor Valentinian II (384AD) .  
'secretly' to a third person with instructions to pass the property on to its intended 
beneficiary. As we have seen, however, this legal loophole was also a time-honoured 
(elite) practice: Constantine had tried and failed to stop the practice in 317AD by 
setting up a specific procedure for denouncing 'secret trusts'.
85
 Nor did Valentinian's 
370AD constitution end this strategic practice. According to the monk and ascetic 
Jerome, writing from a hermit's cell in the Palestinian desert in 393AD, whilst idol-
worshipping (pagan) priests, mime artists, charioteers and prostitutes could all inherit 
property, only clerics and monks were forced to get around the law through 
fideicommissa.
86
 For Jerome, the use of fideicommissa was justified by Christ and the 
Gospels when it was done by a bishop, acting on behalf of the 'mother church', in 
order to provide for the poor; but the use of fideicommissa was shameful when used 
by priests to amass private fortunes for themselves.
87
 Jerome thus provided a specific 
moral justification for those ecclesiastics who attempted to circumvent imperial 
restrictions for the 'right' reasons.  
 Late Roman emperors also variously curtailed the testamentary rights of Jews, 
Samaritans, individuals identified as members of named heretical groups and 
apostates from Christianity. In the case of apostates from Christianity, a series of 
imperial constitutions excerpted under Book 16, title 7 of the Theodosian Code 
prohibits them from making donations and wills - with certain exceptions for wills 
that institute their sui heredes as heirs. The right to acquire inheritances is also limited 
                                                            
85 CTh 16.2.27 (given at Milan, 390AD) forbids women who have become 'deaconesses' from drafting 
secret fideicommissa with clerics as beneficiaries, alongside laying down other restrictions. This 
constitution was repealed in the same year (CTh 16.2.28, given at Verona). See also Marcion Novel 5 
(455AD) and Marjoran Novel 6.11  
86 Jerome, Letter 52.6, addressed to the monk-cleric Nepotian. ‘Pudet dicere sacerdotes idolorum, 
mimi et aurigae et scorta hereditates capiunt; solis clericis et monachis hoc lege prohibetur...’  
87 Jerome, Letter 52.6. ‘Per fidei commissa legibus inludimus, et quasi maiora sint imperatorum scita 
quam Christi, leges timemus, evangelia contemnimus. Sit heres, sed mater filiorum, id est gregis sui, 
ecclesia, quae illos genuit, nutrivit et pavit. Quid nos inserimus inter matrem et liberos? Gloria episcopi 
est pauperum opibus providere, ignominia omnium sacerdotum est propriis studere divitiis.’ 
- again, with exceptions where the apostates themselves have been named as the sui 
heredes. An imperial constitution issued in 383AD opened the way for posthumous 
accusations against Christian apostates who could be shown to have gone over to the 
'sacrileges of temples', to the Jewish rites, or to the infamy of the Manichaeans.88 Any 
person, for example an aggrieved heir or family member, could posthumously accuse 
a decedent of apostasy from Christianity and thus challenge his or her last testament, 
as long as that person had not themselves acquiesced in the apostasy. The accuser had 
to bring their suit within five years of the testator's death, by analogy with the rule 
already established for actions against inofficious wills. A later 426AD constitution 
covers the reverse scenario: if the sons, daughters or grandchildren of Jews and 
Samaritans convert to Christianity they cannot be disinherited, or passed over in a 
testament, or left less than what they would have been entitled to had they succeeded 
on intestacy.89 In other words, if a converted son, daughter or grandchild brought an 
action for an undutiful will against their Jewish or Samaritan parent or grandparent 
they would succeed. Numerous late Roman imperial constitutions restrict the legal 
capacities of 'heretics' to bequeath and receive inheritances and gifts. Those named 
include Manichees, Eunomians, Macedonians, Arians, Apollinarians, Phrygians, 
Priscillianists, Donatists (alongside 'those who profane the holy mysteries by 
repeating baptism') and Eutychians.
90
 The emperors also attempted to regulate the 
succession to inheritances where a child was born into a heretical sect and had 
                                                            
88 CTh 16.7.3, given at Padua, 383 AD. 
89 CTh 16.8.28, given at Ravenna, 426AD. 
90 See CTh 16.5.7 (given at Constantinople, 381 AD); CTh 16.5.9 (given at Constantinople, 382 AD); 
CTh 16.5.17-18 (given at Milan and Rome, 389 AD); CTh 16.7.4 (given at Concordia, 391 AD); CTh 
16.5.23 (given at Adrianople, 394AD); CTh 16.5.25 (given at Constantinople, 395 AD); CTh 16.5.27 
(given at Constantinople 395 AD); CTh 16.5.36 (given at Constantinople 399 AD); CTh 16.5.54 (given 
at Ravenna, 414); and CI 1.5.8 (given at Constantinople, 455 AD). 
subsequently become a Christian.91 With all these various legal enactments we see 
late Roman legislators themselves engaged in strategic behaviour, attempting to use 
the Roman law of donation and inheritance as a means of socio-religious control. 
 Once again, we find 'secret trusts' being outlawed, this time in cases where 
heretics and adherents of other proscribed sects were the intended beneficiaries.
92
 
Reading between the lines of these late Roman prohibitions it seems clear that 
individuals were in fact attempting to circumvent the law by fraudulent schemes: 
making gifts and legacies over to a third person in order to benefit an adherent of a 
proscribed sect or effecting fictitious sales. The ingenuity of these strategies should 
remind us that, for certain 'heretics', stricken with civil disabilities, it was worth 
spending time and money on dodging the law. Conversely, for some private 
individuals it also became worth spending time and money in order to prove an 
accusation of apostasy or heresy against someone else, especially when that 
accusation could lead to securing the title to an inheritance or gift. As a Novel of the 
emperor Theodosius II laments less than five years after the promulgation of his 
lawcode: ‘Almost nothing is devised for the welfare of the human race which is not 
converted by the clever plans of men into fraud and malice.’.93 
 In the course of the fifth and sixth centuries the Roman rules and regulations 
concerning who exactly had the civil capacities to do what in relation to gift-giving 
and inheritance became extremely complicated. Late Roman legislators worked 
within a legal framework governed by the past, but they were forced to expand that 
framework into new areas, in order to cover new - Christian - realities.
94 Christian 
                                                            
91 CTh 16.5.7.2, given at Constantinople, 381 AD. 
92 See further Johnston, The Roman Law of Trust, 71-72. 
93 NTh 21.2 pr, trans Pharr. 
94 On the problems that could arise in the drafting of wills in favour of ('orthodox') churches and 
charitable causes see CJ.1.3.48.2 (531 AD) and Justinian Novel 131.9 (545 AD)., with further 
clerics and monks had to work within and around that legal system. Institutional 
Christianity, as we have seen, benefitted from the fact that the Roman law of 
succession ‘...did not prescribe or allow just one pattern of behaviour, but presented 
an array of instruments and rules that permitted testators to pursue an almost infinite 
variety of goals’.95 One of the goals of late Roman emperors from at least Theodosius 
II onwards, however, was the exclusive establishment of Christian 'orthodoxy'. It is in 
this realm that late Roman legislators displayed their greatest legal ingenuity in terms 
of the rules and regulations governing donations and inheritances.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
discussion in A. Metro, “La legislazione del tardoantico in materia di disposizioni testamentarie in 
favore dei poveri,” Atti dell' Accademia Romanistica Costantiniana XVII (2010): 269-276. According 
to CJ 1.3.40 (524 AD) some churches provided their own legal experts (defensores ecclesiae) in order 
to dictate the last wills and legacies of dying persons to them. 
95 Saller, “Roman Heirship Strategies”, 29. 
